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Abstract
We consider the problem of choosing a subset of a finite set of indivisible
objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by Barberà, Son-
nenschein, and Zhou (1991). Here we assume that agents’ preferences are
separable weak orderings. Given such a preference, objects are partitioned
into three types, “goods”, “bads”, and “nulls”. We focus on “voting rules”,
which rely only on this partition rather than the full information of pref-
erences. We characterize voting rules satisfying strategy-proofness (no one
can ever be better off by lying about his preference) and null-independence
(the decision on each object should not be dependent on the preference of
an agent for whom the object is a null). We also show that serially dictato-
rial rules are the only voting rules satisfying efficiency as well as the above
two axioms. We show that the “separable domain” is the unique maxi-
mal domain over which each rule in the first characterization, satisfying a
certain fairness property, is strategy-proof.
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1 Introduction
Collective decision is often required to be made on multiple issues. We consider
a simple model, in which each issue is associated with two possible decisions. For
example, in Congress, legislators need to consider several bills at the same time.
They can either accept or reject each bill. Another example is the problem of
qualifying members of a society for a certain activity. Each member is either
qualified or disqualified.
Such a problem can be represented by the problem of choosing a subset of
a set of indivisible objects (public projects, facilities, laws, etc.) studied by
Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).1 Each subset is an alternative and
agents have preferences over these alternatives. A social choice rule, or simply,
a rule, associates with each preference profile a single desirable alternative. We
are interested in rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one
can ever be better off by lying about his preference.
When there is no restriction on admissible preferences, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem (Gibbard, 1973 and Satterthwaite, 1975) applies. Every strategy-proof
rule satisfying the “full-range condition”, or voter sovereignty, is dictatorial, when
there are at least three alternatives. However, it is often the case that the con-
sumption of an object affects agents’ welfare separately from the consumptions
of other objects. When preferences have such a “separability” restriction, the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem does not apply. A great variety of strategy-proof
rules, called schemes of “voting by committees”, are characterized by Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). They also show that within these rules, only dic-
tatorial ones are efficient, when there are at least three objects. These results are
established under the additional restriction of linearity (no indifference between
any two alternatives) on preferences.
They do not apply directly in the domain of separable but possibly non-linear
preferences, which we think is more natural. Even if non-linear preferences are
admissible, all schemes of voting by committees are still strategy-proof. However,
they may not be the only such rules. On the other hand, no scheme of voting
by committees is efficient when non-linear preferences are admissible (dictatorial
schemes are “weakly efficient” but not efficient). In order to satisfy efficiency,
we need more sophisticated decisions. No earlier study on this choice problem, so
far, provides a characterization of strategy-proof rules for separable and possibly
non-linear preferences. We establish one such result by imposing the following
two additional requirements.
1See also Barberà, Massó, and Neme (1997, 2000).
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Given a separable preference, objects are partitioned into three kinds; “goods”,
“bads”, and “nulls” (an object is a good if its consumption always increases the
welfare, independently of other objects; it is a bad if its consumption always de-
creases the welfare; it is a null if its consumption never makes any difference).2
We require that decisions should rely only on such simple “three-tiered” informa-
tion rather than the full information of preferences. We refer to this requirement
as votes-only property and refer to rules satisfying it as voting rules. We next
introduce a new requirement, called null-independence, which says that if an ob-
ject is a null for an agent, then his preference should not play a critical role in
the decision on this object.
We characterize the family of strategy-proof rules satisfying votes-only prop-
erty and null-independence. This family (to be explained later) includes all
schemes of voting by committees; it is much bigger than that. Adding efficiency,
we characterize “serially dictatorial rules”, under which a priority ordering of
agents is given and the first agent, the dictator, always guarantees one of his pre-
ferred alternatives and the second agent always guarantees one of his preferred
alternatives in the set of dictator’s preferred alternatives and so on. Even though
we weaken efficiency to weak efficiency (no simultaneous welfare improvement of
all agents is possible), we cannot escape dictatorship. Finally, we show that the
separable domain is the unique maximal “rich” domain over which each rule in
the first characterization, satisfying a certain fairness property, is strategy-proof.
Votes-only property coincides with “tops-only property” when preferences are
linear. As shown by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991), tops-only property
is implied by strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty. However, when non-linear
preferences are admissible, this implication does not hold: see Example ??. For
linear preferences, any object is either a good or a bad (there is no null). So
null-independence is vacuously satisfied by any rule.
Another important line of research on similar choice problems has been di-
rected to study several normative requirements of social choice rules. Among
others are Wilson (1975), Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), Kasher and Rubin-
stein (1998), and Samet and Schmeidler (2001).3 We establish logical relations
between our main requirements and the following two central requirements in
2When preferences are additively separable, an object is a good if and only if it gives positive
utility, it is a bad if and only if it gives negative utility, and it is a null if and only if it gives
zero utility.
3Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) and Samet and Schmeidler (2001) consider problems which
are special examples of our choice problem. In particular, Samet and Schmeidler (2001) consider
the “qualification problem”, in which the set of objects coincide with the set of individuals.
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this literature. Monotonicity requires that when the set of goods expands and
the set of bads contracts for each agent, the choice should expand.4 Independence
requires that the decision on an object should rely only on agents’ three-tiered
evaluations on this object.5
We show that voting rules satisfying monotonicity and independence are de-
scribed in terms of sets consisting of pairs of disjoint groups, called “power struc-
tures”. For each object, a power structure is given and the object is chosen if
and only if the group of agents in favor of the object and the group against it
constitute a pair in that power structure. Each power structure has the natural
property that the decisive power of a group against another increases if the for-
mer group expands and the latter group contracts. We call the family of all such
rules Family Φ∗. We show that a voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness and null -
independence if and only if it satisfies monotonicity and independence. Therefore,
rules in Family Φ∗ are the only voting rules satisfying strategy-proofness and
null -independence. Adding some combinations of efficiency, voter sovereignty,
anonymity, and neutrality, we characterize several subfamilies of Family Φ∗.
Our study is related with the following literature. Public goods problems often
have the form of decisions from a discrete or indiscrete box (Cartesian product
of intervals). Components of each point in the box represent levels of their cor-
responding public goods provision. In the 1-dimensional case, Moulin (1980)
exhibits a remarkable contrast to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem by char-
acterizing a great variety of strategy-proof rules for “single-peaked preferences”.
He focuses on rules, called “voting schemes”, which depend only on agents’ peaks
for each preference profile. He shows that a family of rules, called “generalized
median voter schemes” are the only strategy-proof voting schemes that respect
unanimity in the following sense; whenever everyone’s peak coincides, the com-
mon peak should be chosen.
Border and Jordan (1983) strengthen Moulin’s conclusion by characterizing
the same family of rules in the 1-dimensional case without focusing on vot-
ing schemes. They, moreover, extend this conclusion to the multi-dimensional
case. They consider several multi-dimensional counterparts of the 1-dimensional
single-peakedness. “Star-shaped” preferences have the “1-dimensional single-
4Monotonicity is introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) and Samet and Schmei-
dler (2001) in slightly different forms. We generalize their notion to deal with non-linear
preferences.
5Independence is introduced by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) in the abstract model of
algebraic aggregation. Later, it is considered by Kasher and Rubinstein (1998) and Samet and
Schmeidler (2001).
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peakedness” over each linear path through the peak. “Separable” preferences
have a uniform “marginal preference” over each coordinate, independently of val-
ues of other coordinates. Over the domain of star-shaped separable preferences
or the domain of quadratic separable preferences, they characterize strategy-proof
rules that respect unanimity.
When the alternative space is a discrete box, Barberà, Gül, and Stacchetti (1993)
consider linear preferences satisfying, what they call, “multi-dimensional single-
peakedness” (given an alternative x, any alternative in-between x and the peak in
terms of L1-norm is ordered in-between x and the peak). They show that “multi-
dimensional generalized median voter schemes” are the only strategy-proof rules
satisfying voter sovereignty.6 Their conclusion is generalized by Le Breton and
Sen (1999). They identify a certain general richness condition for domains con-
sisting of linear preferences. The condition encompasses a variety of domains
including the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences. Under this
richness condition, they characterize rules satisfying strategy-proofness and voter
sovereignty.7 When each coordinate in the alternative space contains only two
points, the domain of separable linear preferences satisfies the richness condition.
Thus, their conclusion generalizes also the result by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
Zhou (1991), which is for such “coordinate-wise-binary choice problems”.
Le Breton and Sen (1995) exhibit a difficulty of extending their “decom-
posability result” in linear preference domains to domains with possibly non-
linear preferences. In the coordinate-wise-binary case, we overcome such diffi-
culty by imposing the two additional requirements, votes-only property and null-
independence, which do not have any logical relation with strategy-proofness and
voter sovereignty altogether.
Le Breton and Weymark (1999) consider the multi-dimensional alternative
space. While they also consider possibly non-linear preferences, their main con-
clusions rely either on the assumption that each coordinate has more than two
points or on the assumption that each preference in the domain has a unique
best alternative. Since neither of the two assumptions holds in our domain, their
“component-wise dictatorship” conclusion does not apply. It is remarkable to
notice that Le Breton and Weymark (1999) do not impose any additional re-
quirement other than strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty. They prove that
6Voter sovereignty, here, can be replaced with the requirement of unanimity respect.
7More precisely, their richness is satisfied by a proper subdomain of the domain of multi-
dimensional single-peaked preferences. They first characterize strategy-proof rules in this sub-
domain. Then they extend such characterization and obtains the result by Barberà, Gul, and
Stacchetti (1993).
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strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty imply tops-only property over certain re-
stricted domains that include possibly non-linear preferences but not all of them.
When all non-linear preferences are admissible, such an implication does not hold.
The existence of normatively appealing strategy-proof rules over restricted
domains casts the following important question. How far these domains can be
enlarged with the possibility result intact? This question is addressed by Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). They show that the separable linear domain is
the unique maximal rich domain of linear preferences, over which normatively
appealing schemes of voting by committees are strategy-proof. Whether a similar
result holds without focusing on linear preferences is not studied by them. Since
non-linear preferences may have multiple top alternatives, it is not clear how
to define schemes of voting by committees. For separable preferences, such a
difficulty can be resolved easily using the set of goods instead of top alternatives.
In fact, the set of goods coincides with the intersection of all top alternatives for
separable preferences. We make use of this intersection to define schemes of voting
by committees for arbitrary domains and establish a similar maximal domain
result without focusing on linear preferences. Our result also applies to other rules
in Family Φ∗ which are not schemes of voting by committees. Maximal domain
results are also established in extended models of multidimensional problems by
Serizawa (1995) and Le Breton and Sen (1999).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model
(Section 2.1) and define some important families of rules (Section 2.2). In Sec-
tion 3, we define our axioms. In Section 4, we state our characterization results
(Section 4.1) and the maximal domain result (Section 4.2). We conclude with




There is a finite set A of indivisible objects. Any subset of A is an (social)
alternative. There are n ≥ 2 agents who have preferences (complete and
transitive binary relations) over the set 2A of all social alternatives. Let N ≡
{1, · · · , n} be the set of all agents. For each preference Ri, we denote its strict
relation by Pi and indifference relation by Ii.
We focus on preferences with the following restriction. A preference Ri is
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separable if for all x ∈ A and all X ⊆ A\x,8
[X ∪ x] Pi X if and only if x Pi ∅;
[X ∪ x] Ii X if and only if x Ii ∅.
Let S be the set of all separable preferences. A preference is additively sepa-
rable if it has an additive numerical representation. Let Sadd be the set of all
additively separable preferences. A preference is linear if no two alternatives
are indifferent. Let Slin be the set of all linear separable preferences. Note that
when preferences are linear, the second part of the definition of separability holds
vacuously. So in this case, our definition of separability coincides with the def-
inition by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). For separable preferences,
objects are partitioned into the following three kinds. An object x ∈ A is a good
for Ri ∈ S if for all X ⊆ A\x, [X ∪ x] Pi X. Object x is a bad for Ri if for
all X ⊆ A\x, X Pi [X ∪ x] . Object x is a null for Ri if for all X ⊆ A\x, X
Ii [X ∪ x] . Let G(Ri) be the set of goods for Ri and B(Ri) be the set of bads.
For each R ∈ SN and each x ∈ A, we say that x is a null for R when x is a null
for Ri for each i ∈ N .9 For all R ∈ SN and all x ∈ A, N is partitioned into the
group of agents for whom x is a good, denoted by NGx (R), the group of agents
for whom x is a bad, denoted by NBx (R), and the group of agents for whom x is
a null.
For each agent i, let Di ⊆ S be a set of his admissible preferences. Let
D ≡ D1×· · ·×Dn be the set of profiles of admissible preferences. A social choice
rule, or simply, a rule, is a function ϕ : D → 2A mapping each preference profile
into a single alternative. Thus, we call D the domain of preference profiles.
Important examples of domains are SN , SNadd, and SNlin, which are called the
separable domain, the additive domain, and the linear separable domain
respectively.
We focus on rules that depend only on the simple information of preferences in
terms of goods, bads, and nulls. Formally, a rule ϕ is a voting rule if it satisfies
the following property: for all R,R′ ∈ D, if for all i ∈ N , G (Ri) = G (R′i) and
B (Ri) = B (R
′
i), then ϕ (R) = ϕ (R
′) . We refer to this property as votes-only
property.10
8For convenience, we denote each singleton {x} by x.
9We use notation, R, R′, R̄, R̄′, etc. for elements in RN . Following standard notational
convention, we write i’s component of R with Ri and we write i’s component of R′ with R′i.
10In the domain of separable linear preferences, votes-only property coincides with the “tops-
only property” in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991).
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Important Domain Properties
Our main results are established over the separable domain SN and they
also hold over the additive domain SNadd. We specify several properties of the
two domains, which will play critical roles. Our results will apply to any other
subdomains of the separable domain satisfying these properties. Therefore, in
stating the domain properties, we do not restrict our attention only to the two
domains.
However, we are only interested in domains that admit a sufficiently large
variety of preferences in the sense described by the following three properties A1,
A2, and A3.
The first property is that each object is potentially a good and also potentially
a bad in the domain.
A1. For all i ∈ N and all x ∈ A, there exists Ri, R′i ∈ Di such that x ∈ G(Ri)
and x ∈ B (R′i) .
The second property is that for each agent i and each object x, if x is not a
good for a preference Ri, then there is another admissible preference R
′
i that has
more goods, including x, and less bads than Ri.
A2. For all i ∈ N, all Ri ∈ Di and all x ∈ A with x /∈ G(Ri), there exists R′i ∈ Di
such that G(R′i) ⊇ G(Ri) ∪ x and B(R′i) ⊆ B(Ri)\x.
The third property is that for each agent i and each object x, if x is a bad and
a null for preferences Ri and R
′
i, respectively, then there is another admissible
preference R′′i that has more goods and less bads than Ri and for which x is a
null.
A3. For all i ∈ N and all Ri, R′i ∈ Di with x ∈ B(Ri) and x /∈ G (R′i) ∪ B (R′i) ,
there exists R′′i ∈ Di such that G(R′′i ) ⊇ G(Ri), B(R′′i ) ⊆ B(Ri), and x /∈
G(R′′i ) ∪B(R′′i ).
Note that A3 is trivially satisfied by any domain in which no preference has
any null; for example, the linear separable domain SNlin and any subdomain of
SNlin. Two properties, A2 and A3, are somewhat complicated. However, they
are implied by the following natural property. It states that for all two disjoint
subsets of objects, each agent has an admissible preference in which the two sets
become the set of goods and the set of bads.
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A4. For all i ∈ N and all disjoint X,X ′ ⊆ A, there exists Ri ∈ Di such that
G (Ri) = X and B (Ri) = X
′.11
Note that A4 is not satisfied by the linear separable domain SNlin. Yet, both
A2 and A3 are satisfied by SNlin. Property A4 is similar to the “richness property”
by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.605). Their richness property is
stronger than the combination of A1, A2, and A3, for the case of linear separable
preferences.12 The three properties are crucial for showing Proposition 1. We
take several examples of domains satisfying them.
Example 1. Domains satisfying A1, A2, and A3.
(i) The separable domain SN , the additive domain SNadd, and the linear separable
domain SNlin satisfy A1-A3.
(ii) A preference R0 ∈ S is trichotomous if it is described by goods, bads, and
nulls as follows: for all X, X ′ ⊆ A,
X R0 X
′ if and only if |G (R0)∩X|−|B (R0)∩X| ≥ |G (R0)∩X ′|−|B (R0)∩X ′|.
Thus any agent with a trichotomous preference cares only about the “net” num-
ber of goods (the number of goods minus the number of bads). Clearly, each
trichotomous preference is additive. Also all goods are indifferent, all bads are
indifferent, and the utility of each good is equal to the disutility of each bad. Let
STri be the family of all trichotomous preferences. It is easy to show that SNTri
satisfies A1-A3.
(iii) A preference R0 ∈ S is dichotomous if it is trichotomous and all objects
are either goods or bads (no null). Let SDi be the family of all dichotomous pref-
erences. By definition, STri ⊃ SDi. It is easy to show that SNDi satisfies A1-A3. ¤
We will make use of the following additional properties of the separable do-
main SN and the additive domain SNadd. Roughly speaking, both of the first two
properties state that there are at least three objects and the domain admits a
sufficient variety of preferences in ordering the three objects.
Definition. A domain D satisfies Property P if there exist at least three ob-
jects and D satisfies the following two conditions:
P1. For all i ∈ N and all distinct x, y, z ∈ A, there exist Ri, R′i, R̄i, R̄′i ∈ Di such
that x Pi {x, z} Pi y Pi ∅ Pi z and for all w /∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ Pi w;
x P ′i ∅ P ′i y P ′i {x, z} P ′i z and for all w /∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P ′i w;
x P̄i ∅, y P̄i ∅, z P̄i {x, y}, and for all w /∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P̄i w;
11It is easy to show that this property implies A2 and A3. For A2, let X ≡ G (Ri) ∪ x and
X ′ ≡ B (Ri) \x. For A3, let X ≡ G (Ri) and X ′ ≡ B (Ri) \x.
12The proof is available under request.
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∅ P̄ ′i x, ∅ P̄ ′i y, {x, y} P̄ ′i z, and for all w /∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P̄ ′i w.
P2. For all i ∈ N and all distinct x, y, z ∈ A, there exist Ri, R′i ∈ Di such that
x Ii y Ii ∅ and for all w /∈ {x, y} , ∅ Pi w;




i ∅ and for all w /∈ {x, y, z} , ∅ P ′i w.
Definition. A domain D satisfies Property Q if there exist at least three ob-
jects and D satisfies the following two conditions:
Q1. For all i ∈ N and all distinct x, y, z ∈ A, there exist Ri, R′i, R̄i, R̄′i ∈ Di such
that y Pi ∅ Pi z and for all Y, Y ′ ⊆ A\x , [Y ∪ x] Pi Y ′;
x P ′i ∅ P ′i y and for all Y, Y ′ ⊆ A\z , Y P ′i [Y ′ ∪ z] ;
x P̄i ∅, y P̄i ∅, and for all Y, Y ′ ⊆ A\z , [Y ∪ z] P̄i Y ′;
∅ P̄ ′i x, ∅ P̄ ′i y, and for all Y, Y ′ ⊆ A\z , Y P̄ ′i [Y ′ ∪ z] .
Q2. For all i ∈ N and all distinct x, y, z ∈ A, there exists Ri ∈ Di such that
x Ii y Ii z Ii ∅.
Either one of Property P and Property Q is crucial for showing Propositions 2
and 3.
The next property says that for any preference and any good x (bad, respec-
tively), there is an admissible preference that has the same sets of goods and bads
as the initial preference and in which the utility (disutility, respectively) of x is
so great that having x is always better (worse, respectively) than not having it,
independently of decisions on other objects.
Definition. A domain D satisfies Property R if D satisfies the following two
conditions:
R1. For all i ∈ N, all Ri ∈ Di, and all x ∈ G (Ri) , there exists R′i ∈ Di such that
G (R′i) = G (Ri), B (R
′
i) = B (Ri), and for all Y, Y
′ ⊆ A\x , [Y ∪ x] P ′i Y ′.
R2. For all i ∈ N, all Ri ∈ Di, and all x ∈ B (Ri) , there exists R′i ∈ Di such that
G (R′i) = G (Ri), B (R
′
i) = B (Ri), and for all Y, Y
′ ⊆ A\x , Y P ′i [Y ′ ∪ x] .
Property R is crucial for showing Proposition 4 and Theorems 1 and 2. Note
that the linear separable domain SNlin violates Properties P and Q but satisfies
Property R. Neither the trichotomous domain SNTri nor the dichotomous domain
SNDi in Example 1 satisfies any of the three properties.
2.2 Examples of voting rules
We define an important family of voting rules, crucial in our work. These
rules make the decision on each object, according to a predetermined set of
ordered pairs of disjoint groups, or a “power structure”, as follows. The ob-
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ject is chosen if and only if the group of agents in favor of the object and the
group of agents against the object constitute a pair in that set. In this case,
the unanimous approval of the object by members in the first group “overpow-
ers” the unanimous objection by members in the second group. Formally, let
C ≡ {(C1, C2) ∈ 2N × 2N : C1 ∩ C2 = ∅} be the set of all pairs of disjoint
groups of agents. For each x ∈ A, let Cx ⊆ C∗. When (C1, C2) ∈ Cx, we say that
C1 overpowers C2. Set Cx satisfies power-monotonicity, or P-monotonicity if
whenever group C1 overpowers group C2, each supergroup of C1 also overpowers
each disjoint subgroup of C2: that is, for all (C1, C2) ∈ Cx, if (C ′1, C ′2) ∈ C∗ is
such that C ′1 ⊇ C1 and C ′2 ⊆ C2, then (C ′1, C ′2) ∈ Cx. For each x ∈ A, a power
structure associated with x is a set Cx of pairs of disjoint groups, satisfy-
ing P-monotonicity. A profile of power structures is a list (Cx)x∈A of power
structures indexed by objects.
Definition. A rule is in Family Φ if there exists a profile of power struc-





Several properties of profiles of power structures are in order. A profile (Cx)x∈A
satisfies power-unanimity, or P-unanimity if for all x ∈ A, (N,∅) ∈ Cx and
(∅, N) /∈ Cx. It satisfies power-neutrality, or P-neutrality if for all x, y ∈ A and
all (C1, C2) ∈ C∗, (C1, C2) ∈ Cx ⇔ (C1, C2) ∈ Cy. It satisfies power-anonymity, or
P-anonymity if for each x ∈ A, Cx can be described by a set Ix ⊆ {(t1, t2) ∈
Z+ ×Z+ : t1 + t2 ≤ n} as follows: (C1, C2) ∈ Cx ⇔ (|C1|, |C2|) ∈ Ix.14 We call Ix
the index set for x.
Definition (Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). A rule ϕ is a scheme
of voting by committees if for each x ∈ A, there exists a nonempty collection
Cx of groups of agents such that (i) ∅ /∈ Cx; (ii) for all C0 ∈ Cx and all C ′0 ⊇ C0,
C ′0 ∈ Cx; (iii) for all R ∈ D, x ∈ ϕ (R) ⇔ NGx (R) ∈ Cx .
Any scheme of voting by committees associated with (Cx)x∈A is the rule in
Family Φ∗ associated with the following profile of simple power structures (Cx)x∈A.
For all x ∈ A, let Cx ≡ {(C1, C2) ∈ C∗ : C1 ∈ Cx, C2 ⊆ N\C1}. Note that by
nonemptiness of Cx, Cx is nonempty. Then by part (i) in the above definition,
13Power structures and Family Φ∗ are similar to “binary constitutions” and “binary decision
rules” by Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which are preference aggregation rules in the Arrovian
social choice model. Binary constitutions have another restriction, called “asymmetry”, since
they are used to determine social ordering of two alternatives.
14We denote the set of non-negative integers by Z+.
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the profile satisfies P-unanimity. Hence over the linear separable domain SNlin and
also over any subdomain of SNlin, the family of schemes of voting by committees
coincide with the subfamily of Family Φ∗, consisting of rules associated with
P-unanimous profile of power structures.
For all i ∈ N , all Ri ∈ Di, and all X ⊆ 2A, let Max[Ri : X ] be the set of all
best alternatives for Ri in X . A rule ϕ is dictatorial if there exists i ∈ N such
that for all R ∈ D, ϕ(R) ∈ Max [Ri : 2A
]
. We call such i the dictator. Not every
dictatorial rule is in Family Φ∗. A rule in Family Φ∗ is dictatorial if and only
if its profile of power structures (Cx)x∈A has the following property: there exists
i ∈ N such that for all x ∈ A, (i, N\i) ∈ Cx and (N\i, i) /∈ Cx.
Let π be a permutation on N. Let R ∈ D. Let M1(R, π) ≡ Max [Rπ(1) : 2A
]
.
For all k ∈ {2, · · · , n}, let Mk(R, π) ≡ Max [Rπ(k) : Mk−1(R, π)
]
. A rule ϕ is
serially dictatorial with respect to π if for all R ∈ D and all k ∈ N,
ϕ(R) ∈ Mk(R, π). Not every serially dictatorial rule is in Family Φ∗. The power
structure (Cx)x∈A of the serially dictatorial rule in Family Φ
∗, associated with
π is such that for all x ∈ A and all disjoint non-empty groups C1, C2 ⊆ N,
(C1, C2) ∈ Cx if and only if there exists k ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that π (k) ∈ C1 and
for all k′ < k, π (k′) /∈ C1 ∪ C2.
Family Φ∗ is a subset of a larger family of voting rules, in which decisions
are made in the following procedure. First, for each object, the set of agents in
favor of it and the set of agents against it are identified. Second, based on these
two groups, the “score” for the object is determined by a “scoring function” that
maps each pair of disjoint groups into the score (a real number) for the object.
Third, given a list of scores for all objects, the “threshold score” is determined by
a “threshold scoring function” that maps each list of scores into a threshold score.
Finally, each object is accepted if and only if its score is higher than or equal to the
threshold score. Formally, a scoring function associated with x is a mapping
sx : C
∗ → R satisfying the following property: for all (C1, C2), (C ′1, C ′2) ∈ C∗, if
C1 ⊆ C ′1 and C2 ⊇ C ′2, then sx(C1, C2) ≤ sx(C ′1, C ′2). A threshold scoring
function is a mapping s̄ : R|A| → R satisfying the following property: for all
(Sx)x∈A, (S ′x)x∈A ∈ R|A|, if (Sx)x∈A ≤ (S ′x)x∈A, then s̄((Sx)x∈A) ≤ s̄((S ′x)x∈A). A
rule ϕ is a scoring rule if for each x ∈ A, there exist a scoring function sx and
a threshold scoring function s̄ such that for all R ∈ D and all x ∈ A,
x ∈ ϕ(R) ⇔ sx(NGx (R), NBx (R)) ≥ s̄((sx(NGx (R), NBx (R)))x∈A).
For example, plurality-based scoring rule, denoted by ϕpl-scoring, is the scor-
ing rule that is associated with the following scoring functions (sx)x∈A and thresh-
old scoring function s̄: for each x ∈ A and each (C1, C2) ∈ C∗, sx(C1, C2) ≡
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|C1| − |C2| − 1; for each (Sx)x∈A ∈ R|A|, s̄((Sx)x∈A) ≡ max{
∑
x∈A Sx/|A|, 0}.
Clearly, if an object is accepted by plurality-based scoring rule, then there are
more agents in favor of it than agents against it.
Every rule in Family Φ∗, associated with (Cx)x∈A, is a scoring rule whose
threshold scoring function is constant with the value 1 and whose profile of scoring
functions (sx)x∈A are such that for all x ∈ A and all (C1, C2) ∈ C∗,
sx(C1, C2) =
{
1, if (C1, C2) ∈ Cx;
0, otherwise.
Note that for any scoring rule, the score for each object x at a preference profile
R is determined by
(




and so other information in (G (Ri) , B (Ri))i∈N
do not play any role for the score of x. In particular, for rules in Family Φ∗, the
decision on x, not just the score, rely only on
(





objects are made “independently”. However there are a variety of other types
of voting rules. For example, weighted plurality rule, denoted by ϕweight-pl,







|B(Ri)| . Thus, for the decision on x, the positive vote
by an agent i in favor of x is weighted by 1|G(Ri)| and the negative vote by an agent
i against x is weighted by 1|B(Ri)| ; x is accepted if and only if the sum of weighted
positive votes is bigger than the sum of weighted negative votes.
3 Axioms
In this section, we define several important strategic and non-strategic require-
ments, or axioms, of rules. We start with our two main axioms. The first axiom
requires that misrepresenting one’s preference should never pay off, independently
of what others’ representations are.
Strategy-Proofness. For all R ∈ D, all i ∈ N, and all R′i ∈ Di,
ϕ(Ri, R−i) Ri ϕ(R′i, R−i).
If a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, it can be implemented in dominant strat-
egy equilibrium in the “direct revelation mechanism”, and conversely. We refer
readers to Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
Zhou (1991), and Thomson (2000) for more discussions on strategy-proofness. In
particular, Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) consider the same model as
ours and study strategy-proof rules over the linear separable domain.
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We next introduce a new axiom. Suppose that an object a is a null for an
agent i. Then the decision on a will never have any effect on agent i’s welfare and
so he will be indifferent to the decision. It would be unappealing if the preference
of such an agent plays a key role in the decision on a. The next axiom rules out
this possibility. Formally:
Null-Independence. For all i ∈ N, all x ∈ A, all Ri, R′i ∈ Di, and all R−i ∈
Πj 6=iDj, if x is null for both Ri and R′i, then
x ∈ ϕ(Ri, R−i) ⇔ x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Example 2. Family Φ∗. Every rule in Family Φ∗ satisfies both axioms. Null-
independence is trivial. Strategy-proofness can be shown as follows. Each rule
ϕ in Family Φ∗ makes decisions object-by-object. That is, the decision on each
object x relies only on the group of agents in favor of x and the group of agents
against x. Moreover, the decision responds non-negatively to the increase in the
first group and non-positively to the increase in the second group. Thus, when
an agent is in favor of x, he cannot increase the chance of the acceptance of x by
saying he is against x. He cannot be better off by such a lie. Similarly, an agent
cannot be better off by saying he is in favor of x, when he is against x. Therefore
truthful announcement is always weakly better than lying, independently of what
others’ announcements are. ¤
Example 3. Scoring rules. Our results will imply that all scoring rules not in
Family Φ∗ violate at least one of the two axioms. Here we show that plurality-
based scoring rule ϕpl-scoring violates both strategy-proofness and null-independence.
For simplicity, suppose that there are three agents and three objects and let
N ≡ {1, 2, 3} and A ≡ {a, b, c}. Consider a preference profile (R1, R2, R3)
such that (G(R1), B(R1)) = ({a, b},∅), (G(R2), B(R2)) = ({a, c}, {b}), and
(G(R3), B(R3)) = ({a, b}, {c}). Then the score of a is 2, the score of b is 0 and the
score of c is -1. Therefore the threshold score is the average score 1/3 and so only
object a is chosen, that is, ϕpl-scoring(R) = {a}. Now suppose that agent 1 with
true preference R1 reports R
′




1)) = ({a, b}, {c}). Then the
score of c decreases to -2, which lowers the average score and the threshold score
to 0. Since there is no change in the scores of a and b, a is still chosen and now,
in addition, b is chosen, that is, ϕpl-scoring(R′1, R2, R3) = {a, b}. Since {a, b} P1
{a}, agent 1 is better off after the misrepresentation with R′1. It is easy to show
that this rule also violates null-independence.15 ¤
15Let R1, R2, and R3 be such that (G(R1), B(R1)) = ({a, b},∅), (G(R2), B(R2)) =
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We relate the two main axioms with the following two axioms, called “mono-
tonicity” and “independence”, studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), Kasher
and Rubinstein (1998), and Samet and Schmeidler (2001).16
Monotonicity requires that when the set of goods expands and the set of bads
contracts for every agent, the choice should expand. Formally:
Monotonicity. For all R, R′ ∈ D, if for all i ∈ N, G(Ri) ⊆ G(R′i) and B(Ri) ⊇
B(R′i), then ϕ(R) ⊆ ϕ(R′).
The next axiom requires that the decision on each object should depend only
on agents’ evaluations of this object in terms of good, bad, or null. For all






Independence. For all x ∈ A and all R, R′ ∈ D with R|{{x},?} = R′|{{x},?},
x ∈ ϕ(R) ⇔ x ∈ ϕ(R′) .
We consider the above axioms in conjunction with several combinations of
the following standard axioms. We first define useful notation. Given each per-
mutation on N, π : N → N and each R ∈ D, let R ≡ (Rπ(i))i∈N . For each
x, y ∈ A and each X ∈ 2A, let ρx;y (X) ∈ 2A be such that x ∈ ρx,y(X) ⇔ y ∈ X,
y ∈ ρx,y(X) ⇔ x ∈ X, and for all z ∈ X\{x, y}, z ∈ ρx,y(X). Thus, ρx,y is the
renaming operation that switch names between x and y. Given i ∈ N, for each
Ri ∈ Di, let ρx;yRi ∈ Di be the preference where the roles of x and y in Ri are
switched: that is, for all X,X ′ ⊆ A, X ρx,yRi X ′ ⇔ ρx,y(X) Ri ρx,y(X ′). Then x
(or y) plays the same role in Ri as y (or x) does in ρx,yRi. For each R ∈ D, let
ρx;yR ≡ (ρx,yRi)i∈N .
Voter sovereignty. For all x ∈ A, there exist R,R′ ∈ D such that x ∈ ϕ (R)
and x /∈ ϕ (R′) .17
Weak efficiency. For all R ∈ D, there exists no X ⊆ A such that for all i ∈ N ,
X Pi ϕ(R).
({a, c}, {b}), and (G(R3), B(R3)) = ({a, b, c},∅). Then ϕpl-scoring (R) = {a}. Let R′1 be such
that (G (R′1) , B (R
′
1)) = ({a}, {b}) . Then ϕpl-scoring (R′1, R2, R3) = {a, c}. Since c is a null for
both R1 and R′1, this shows a violation of null-independence.
16Our axioms are stated differently from the axioms in these papers. We generalize their
axioms in order to deal with non-linear preferences.
17Our voter sovereignty is weaker than “voter sovereignty” in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
Zhou (1991), which states that for all X ∈ 2A, there exists R ∈ D such that ϕ (R) = X.
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Efficiency. For all R ∈ D, there exists no X ⊆ A such that for all i ∈ N , X Ri
ϕ(R) and for some j ∈ N, X Pj ϕ(R).
Anonymity. For all R ∈ D and all permutation π on N, ϕ(R) = ϕ(Rπ).
Neutrality. For all R ∈ D and all x, y ∈ A, x ∈ ϕ(R) if and only if y ∈ ϕ(ρx,yR).
4 Results
4.1 Characterizations of strategy-proof voting rules
Throughout Section 4.1, we consider the separable domain (our results also apply
to the additive domain) unless stated otherwise. We first characterize rules that
satisfy monotonicity, independence, and some combinations of voter sovereignty,
anonymity, and neutrality.
Proposition 1. A rule satisfies monotonicity and independence if and only if
it is in Family Φ∗.
See the proof in the Appendix.
Remark 1. In proving Proposition 1, we only use the three properties, A1-A3, of
the separable domain. Thus, the same result also holds for any other subdomains
satisfying these properties.18 Examples are subdomains in Example 1.
Within Family Φ∗, it is easy to show that voter sovereignty, anonymity,
18For domains without properties A1-A3, Proposition 1 may not hold. Here is an example.
For simplicity, let A ≡ {a, b, c} and N ≡ {1, 2}. Let D∗ be the domain consisting of only the
following three admissible preferences. First is a preference R0, in which only a is a good and
both b and c are nulls. Second is a preference R′0, in which only b is a good and both a and c
are nulls. Last is a preference R′′0 , in which a is a good, b is a bad, and c is a null. Then clearly
this domain D∗ violates A1, since a is never a bad and c is always a null. Let ϕ∗ be the rule
defined in the following table, where each cell represents the choice for the profile composed of






R0 {a, b} {a, b} {a}
R′0 {a, b} ∅ {a}
R′′0 {a} {a} {a}
Note that the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts only when preference changes
from R′′0 to R0. So clearly, ϕ
∗ satisfies monotonicity. It is tedious to check independence of ϕ∗.
However since b ∈ ϕ∗(R0, R0) and b /∈ ϕ∗(R′0, R′0), then ϕ∗ violates objectwise monotonicity
(see p.27 for the definition) and so is not a rule in Family Φ∗.
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and neutrality are equivalent respectively to three properties, P-unanimity, P-
anonymity, and P-neutrality, of profiles of power structures. Therefore, we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (i) A rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and voter sovereignty
if and only if it is a rule in Family Φ∗ associated with a P-unanimous profile of
power structures.
(ii) A rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and anonymity if and only if it
is a rule in Family Φ∗ associated with a P-anonymous profile of power structures.
(iii) A rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and neutrality if and only if it
is a rule in Family Φ∗ associated with a P-neutral profile of power structures.
The corresponding examples to show the independence of axioms in Proposi-
tion 1 and also in Corollary 1 can be easily obtained. Adding efficiency, we are
left only with serially dictatorial rules in Family Φ∗. Formally:
Proposition 2. A rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and efficiency if
and only if it is a serially dictatorial rule in Family Φ∗.
Although we relax efficiency with weak efficiency, we cannot escape dictator-
ship.
Proposition 3. A rule satisfies monotonicity, independence, and weak effi-
ciency if and only if it is a dictatorial rule in Family Φ∗.
See the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 in the Appendix A.
Remark 2. In proving Propositions 2 and 3, we use either one of the two prop-
erties, Property P and Property Q, of the separable domain. The two results
can also be established for any subdomain satisfying Property P or Property Q.19
For domains not satisfying either one of the two properties, the results may not
19Properties A1-A3 are also required for Propositions 2 and 3. For example, in the domain






R0 {a, b} {a, b} {a}
R′0 {a, b} {b} {a}
R′′0 {a} {a} {a}
Note that the set of goods expands and the set of bads contracts only when preference changes
from R′′0 to R0. So clearly, ϕ satisfies monotonicity. It is tedious to show independence and
efficiency of ϕ. Since agent 1 does not attain his best alternative at (R′0, R
′′
0 ) and agent 2
does not attain his best alternative at (R′′0 , R
′
0), none of them can be a dictator. So ϕ is not
dictatorial.
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hold. For instance, when there are only two objects (see Example ?? for an-
other example with more than three objects), there exist non-dictatorial rules
satisfying the three axioms. For example, consider the following rule. Let
τ : {(C1, C2) ∈ C∗ : |C1| = |C2|} → {0, 1} be a function, called, tie-breaking
function, such that for each pair (C1, C2) of disjoint groups with the same size,
either τ(C1, C2) = 1 or τ(C2, C1) = 1 but not both. Let ϕ
τ be the rule that makes
the same decision on each object x as the “plurality rule” whenever the group
of agents in favor of x and the group of agents against x have different sizes.
When the sizes of the two groups ties, the decision relies on the tie-breaking
function τ . Formally, for all R ∈ SN and all x ∈ X, (i) if |NGx (R)| 6= |NBx (R)|,
then x ∈ ϕτ (R, X) ⇔ |NGx (R)| > |NBx (R)| ; (ii) if |NGx (R)| = |NBx (R)|, then
x ∈ ϕτ (R, X) ⇔ τ(NGx (R), NBx (R)) = 1 . By definition, ϕτ , which is neither se-
rially dictatorial nor dictatorial in Family Φ∗, clearly satisfies monotonicity and
independence. However, it is shown by Ju (2002a) that ϕτ satisfies efficiency
when there are only two objects. In the “variable agenda model”, he charac-
terizes the family of all such rules based on “non-manipulability”, “restricted
efficiency”, and anonymity.
Example 4. Trichotomous or dichotomous preferences. Consider the trichoto-
mous domain SNTri and the dichotomous domain SNDi, defined in Example 1. Every
preference Ri in both domains is represented by Ui defined as follows: for all
X ⊆ A, Ui (X) ≡ |G (Ri)∩X|− |B (Ri)∩X|. Note that for each profile R ∈ SNTri,
the sum of utilities of X,
∑











(|NGx (R) | − |NBx (R) |
)
. (∗)
Clearly, SNTri and SNDi violate both Property P and Q. We now show that over
any one of these two domains, there are non-dictatorial voting rules, for exam-
ple, plurality rule ϕpl, satisfying the three requirements in Proposition 2.21 To
explain this, let R ∈ SNTri and Y ≡ ϕpl (R). Let X ⊆ A. We only have to
show that if someone is better off in X than in Y , then there is another who
is worse off. Note first that for all y ∈ Y , |NGy (R) | − |NBy (R) | > 0 and all
x /∈ Y , |NGx (R) | − |NBx (R) | ≤ 0. Hence
∑
x∈X\Y
(|NGx (R) | − |NBx (R) |
) ≤ 0
20See Lemma 1 in Ju (2002c) for the proof.
21Ju (2002c) characterizes rules satisfying efficiency, independence, and anonymity over the





(|NGy (R) | − |NBy (R) |
)
> 0 and so
∑
x∈X\Y















(|NGy (R) | − |NBy (R) |
)
.
Therefore by (∗), ∑i∈N Ui (X) ≤
∑
i∈N Ui (Y ). It follows from this inequality
that if someone is better off in X than in Y , then there is another who is worse
off. ¤
We next establish the logical relation between the following two combinations
of axioms; the combination of strategy-proofness and null-independence and the
combination of monotonicity and independence. We show that within voting
rules, the two combinations are equivalent.
Proposition 4. A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness and null-independence
if and only if it satisfies monotonicity and independence.
See the proof in the Appendix. Now we are ready to state our main results.
It follows from Propositions 1 and 4 that rules in Family Φ∗ are the only voting
rules satisfying strategy-proofness and null-independence. Formally:
Theorem 1. A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness and null-independence if
and only if it is in Family Φ∗.
Examples ??-?? establish the independence of strategy-proofness, null-independence,
and votes-only property.
Example 5. Strategy-proofness and null-independence. Let ϕ be such that for
all R ∈ D, ϕ(R) ∈ Max[R1 : {{x} : x ∈ A}]. Then clearly, ϕ satisfies strategy-
proofness and null -independence. However, ϕ violates votes-only property. ¤
Example 6. Strategy-proofness and votes-only property. Define ϕ as follows. For
each R ∈ D, (i) if G(R1) 6= ∅, ϕ(R) ≡ G(R1), (ii) if G(R1) = ∅ and B(R1) 6= ∅,
ϕ(R) ≡ A\B(R1), and (iii) if G(R1) = ∅ = B(R1), ϕ(R) ≡ ∅. Clearly, ϕ satisfies
votes-only property. Since agent 1 always attains one of his best alternatives and
ϕ does not depend on any other’s preference, ϕ is strategy-proof. Suppose that
x is a null for both R1 and R
′
1 and that part (ii) applies for R1 and part (iii)
applies for R′1. Then for all R−1 ∈ ΠN\1Di, x ∈ ϕ(R1, R−1) and x /∈ ϕ(R′1, R−1).
Therefore ϕ violates null-independence. ¤
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Example 7. Null-independence and votes-only property. Consider the weighted
plurality rule ϕweight-pl. Clearly, ϕweight-pl satisfies null-independence and votes-only







and for some i ∈ NGx (R) , |G (Ri) | ≥ 2 and if X,X ′ ⊆ A\x, X ∪ x Pi X ′.
Then x /∈ ϕweight-pl (R) . However, if i reports R′i such that G (R′i) = {x}, then
x ∈ ϕweight-pl (R′i, R−i) and so ϕweight-pl (R′i, R−i) Pi ϕweight-pl (Ri, R−i) , violating
strategy-proofness. ¤
It follows from Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 that:
Corollary 2. (i) A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence,
and voter sovereignty if and only if it is a rule in Family Φ∗, associated with a
P-unanimous profile of power structures.
(ii) A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence, and anonymity
if and only if it is a rule in Family Φ∗, associated with a P-anonymous profile of
power structures.
(iii) A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence, and neutrality
if and only if it is a rule in Family Φ∗, associated with a P-neutral profile of power
structures.
Remark 3. In proving Proposition 4, Theorem 1, and Corollary 2, Property R
plays a critical role. Therefore, the same results can be established for any sub-
domain satisfying this property. These results may not hold for domains not
satisfying Property R. See Example ?? below.
Example 8. A strategy-proof and null-independent rule over the dichotomous
domain SNDi , which is not in Family Φ∗. Define ϕ∗ as follows. Fix two objects
















∣∣, then a∗ ∈ ϕ∗ (R) ⇔ [b∗ ∈ ϕ∗ (R)].
Note that when the number of agents is even, ϕ∗ clearly is not in Family Φ∗. Note
also that for all R ∈ SNDi, ϕ∗ (R) \a∗ = ϕpl (R) \a∗ and that when a∗ ∈ ϕpl (R),
ϕ∗ (R) = ϕpl (R) and when a∗ /∈ ϕpl (R), ϕ∗ (R) = ϕpl (R) ∪ a∗ if and only if a∗
makes a tie at R and b∗ ∈ ϕpl (R). Decisions by ϕ∗ do not depend on agents’ labels
(or names). So ϕ∗ is anonymous. Since SNDi does not allow for nulls, ϕ∗ satisfies
null-independence vacuously. To give an intuition for strategy-proofness, consider







∣∣. Then by definition, b∗ is rejected and so a∗ is also rejected
at R. Consider an agent i ∈ N for whom a∗ is a good and b∗ is a bad. He can make
a∗ accepted only by reporting b∗ as a good and such a misrepresentation will make
20
b∗, which is a bad for him, accepted also. Since his preference is dichotomous,
the utility from a∗ will be cancelled out by the disutility from b∗. Therefore,
such a misrepresentation will not benefit him. Considering different cases, one
by one, we can show that no one can ever be benefited by misrepresenting his
preference.22 ¤
Over the linear separable domain SNlin, null-independence is vacuously satisfied
by any rule. Thus, it follows from Corollary 2 and Remark 3 that:
Corollary 3. Over the linear separable domain SNlin, schemes of voting by com-
mittees are the only voting rules satisfying strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty.
By Propositions 2, 3, and 4, we characterize serially dictatorial or dictatorial
rules in Family Φ∗. Formally:
Theorem 2. (i) A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence,
and efficiency if and only if it is a serially dictatorial rule in Family Φ∗.
(ii) A voting rule satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence, and weak effi-
ciency if and only if it is a dictatorial rule in Family Φ∗.23
Remark 4. This result can also be obtained over any subdomain satisfying Prop-
erty R and either Property P or Property Q. If the domain violates these prop-
erties, the result may not hold. For example, when there are only two objects,
neither Property P nor Property Q holds and the non-dictatorial rule defined
in Remark ?? satisfies strategy-proofness, null-independence, and efficiency. An-
other examples are the trichotomous domain and the dichotomous domain. As
explained in Example ??, the plurality rule satisfies all the three axioms.
4.2 The maximal domain result
In this section, we study how further the domain can be enlarged in order for
rules in Family Φ∗ to be strategy-proof. To address this question, we need a more
general definition of rules in Family Φ∗. Our previous definition is made in terms
of the set of goods and the set of bads, which are well-defined only for separable
preferences. Note that the set of goods coincides with the intersection of all
“top (or best) alternatives” and the set of bads coincides with the intersection
of all “bottom (or worst) alternatives”. We use these intersections to extend the
definition of rules in Family Φ∗.
22Formal proof is provided in the Appendix of Ju (2002c). He also shows that over the
dichotomous domain, ϕ∗ satisfies efficiency.
23Examples showing independence of axioms in Theorem 2 are available upon request.
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For all preferences Ri, let T
 (Ri) be the intersection of all top alternatives
and B (Ri) the intersection of all bottom alternatives. For example, when Ri is
separable, T ∗ (Ri) = G (Ri) and B∗ (Ri) = B (Ri) . For each preference profile R,
let NT

x (R) ≡ {i ∈ N : x ∈ T ∗ (Ri)} and NB

x (R) ≡ {i ∈ N : x ∈ B∗ (Ri)}. We
extend the definition of Family Φ∗, replacing NGx (R) and N
B
x (R) in the previous
definition with NT
∗
x (R) and N
B∗
x (R) respectively. More precisely, a rule ϕ is in
Family Φ∗ if for each object x ∈ A, there exists a power structure Cx such that
for all R ∈ D, x ∈ ϕ (R) ⇔ (NT ∗x (R) , NB∗x (R)
) ∈ Cx .
Throughout this section, we restrict our attention to domains in which any
object that is either in all top alternatives or in all bottom alternatives is critical
when added to any alternative not including it. The addition either makes an
improvement or the opposite. Formally:
Assumption D. For all i ∈ N, all Ri ∈ Di, all x ∈ T ∗ (Ri) ∪ B∗ (Ri) , and all
X ⊆ A\x, either X ∪ x Pi X or X Pi X ∪ x.
Clearly, both the separable domain and the additive domain satisfy this as-
sumption. However, it has nothing to do with the separability restriction. Indeed,
any domain consisting of linear preferences satisfies Assumption D.
We further focus on domains that have enough variety of preferences in the
following sense.
Definition. Domain D is rich if for all i ∈ N and all disjoint alternatives
X,X ′ ⊆ A, there exists Ri ∈ Di such that T ∗ (Ri) = X and B∗ (Ri) = X ′.
Note that the richness property is an extension of property A4, which applies
to subdomains of the separable domain. It corresponds to the richness property
considered by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.605).
Given a power structure C, a pair (C1, C2) ∈ C is minimal in C if there exists
no (C ′1, C
′
2) ∈ C\ (C1, C2) such that C ′1 ⊆ C1 and C ′2 ⊇ C2. A pair (C1, C2) ∈ C∗\C
is maximal in C\C if there exists no (C ′1, C ′2) ∈ C∗\C such that (C ′1, C ′2) 6=
(C1, C2), C
′
1 ⊇ C1, and C ′2 ⊆ C2. Let ϕ be a rule in Family Φ∗ associated with
profile (Cx)x∈A . Agent i ∈ N is a dummy of object x if either (i) for all minimal
pair (C1, C2) in Cx, i /∈ C1 or (ii) for all maximal pair (C1, C2) in C∗\Cx, i /∈ C2.24
Thus, the dummy agent does not play any essential role in accepting or rejecting
x. Agent i ∈ N is a vetoer of object x if either for all (C1, C2) ∈ Cx, i /∈ C2 or
for all (C1, C2) ∈ C∗\Cx, i /∈ C1.25 Thus a vetoer always has an option to reject or
24The definition of dummy is a natural extension of the corresponding notion in Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.606). In the linear domain, they coincide with each other.
25The definition of vetoer is a natural extension of the corresponding notion in Barberà,
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accept x. We are interested in rules in Family Φ∗ that do not have any dummy
or vetoer.
Fact 1. A preference Ri is separable if and only if for all x ∈ A and all X ⊆ A\x,
[X ∪ x] Pi X ⇔ x ∈ T ∗ (Ri) ; (1)
X Pi [X ∪ x] ⇔ x ∈ B∗ (Ri) . (2)
Proof. When Ri is separable, T
∗ (Ri) = G (Ri) and B∗ (Ri) = B (Ri) and (1) and
(2) hold. To prove the converse, suppose (1) and (2). Then for all x ∈ A and all
X ⊆ A\x,
[X ∪ x] Pi X ⇔ x Pi ∅ ;
X Pi [X ∪ x] ⇔ ∅ Pi x ,
which is evidently equivalent to separability.
Proposition 5. For all rules in Family Φ∗ without any dummy or vetoer, if the
rule is strategy-proof over a rich domain, then the domain is a subdomain of the
separable domain.
Proof. Let D be a rich domain. Let ϕ : D → 2A be a rule in Family Φ∗, associated
with (Cx)x∈A. Suppose that ϕ does not have any vetoer or dummy and that ϕ is
strategy-proof. Let i ∈ N and Ri ∈ Di. Let x ∈ A and Y ⊆ A\x. Note that since
agent i is not a dummy, there exist minimal pair (C1, C2) in Cx with i ∈ C1 and
maximal pair (C01 , C
0
2) in C
∗\Cx with i ∈ C02 . Also since i is not a vetoer, for all
y ∈ A, (N\i, i) ∈ Cy and (i, N\i) 6∈ Cy.26
We first show (1) in Fact 1. Suppose x ∈ T ∗ (Ri) . For each j 6= i, let Rj be
such that
T ∗ (Rj) = Y ∪ x and B∗ (Rj) = A\ (Y ∪ x) , if j ∈ C1;
T ∗ (Rj) = Y and B∗ (Rj) = A\Y , if j ∈ C2;









= (C1, C2) ; for all y ∈ Y, NT ∗y (R) ⊇ N\i and
NB
∗
y (R) ⊆ i; for all y ∈ A\ (Y ∪ x) , NT ∗y (R) ⊆ i and NB∗y (R) ⊇ N\i. Since
(N\i, i) ∈ Cy for all y ∈ A, then Y ⊆ ϕ (R) . Since (i, N\i) /∈ Cy for all y ∈ A,
then ϕ (R) ∩ (A\ (Y ∪ x)) = ∅. Hence ϕ (R) = Y ∪ x or Y. Since (C1, C2) ∈ Cx,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, p.606). In the linear domain, the two notions coincide with
each other.
26Since there is no vetoer, then for all y ∈ A, both Cy and C∗\Cy are nonempty. So by
P-monotonicity, (N\i, i) ∈ Cy and (i,N\i) /∈ Cy, for all i ∈ N.
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i, R−i) ⊇ NB∗x (R) = C2. Since (C1, C2) is minimal, x /∈ ϕ (R′i, R−i)
and so ϕ (R′i, R−i) = Y. By strategy-proofness, [Y ∪ x] Ri Y. By Assumption D,
[Y ∪ x] Pi Y.
To prove the converse of (1), suppose x /∈ T ∗ (Ri) . Then NT ∗x (R) = C1\i
and NB
∗
x (R) = C2 or C2 ∪ i. Since (C1, C2) minimal, x /∈ ϕ (R) and ϕ (R) = Y.
Now let R′′i be such that x ∈ T ∗ (R′′i ) . Then ϕ (R′′i , R−i) = Y ∪ x. Therefore, by
strategy-proofness, Y Ri [Y ∪ x] .
Next we show (2) in Fact 1. Suppose x ∈ B∗ (Ri) . For each j 6= i, let Rj be
such that
T ∗ (Rj) = Y ∪ x and B∗ (Rj) = A\ (Y ∪ x) , if j ∈ C01 ;
T ∗ (Rj) = Y and B∗ (Rj) = A\Y , if j ∈ C02 ;









= (C01 , C
0
2) ; for all y ∈ Y, NT ∗y (R) ⊇ N\i and
NB
∗
y (R) ⊆ i; for all y ∈ A\ (Y ∪ x) , NT ∗y (R) ⊆ i and NB∗y (R) ⊇ N\i. Then for
the same reason as above, ϕ (R) = Y ∪ x or Y. Since (C01 , C02) /∈ Cx, ϕ (R) = Y.








i , R−i) =
C02\i. Since (C01 , C02) is maximal in C∗\Cx, x ∈ ϕ(R#i , R−i). Hence ϕ(R#i , R−i) =
Y ∪ x. By strategy-proofness, Y Ri [Y ∪ x] . By Assumption D, Y Pi [Y ∪ x] .
To prove the converse of (2), suppose x /∈ B∗ (Ri) . Then (i) NT ∗x (R) = C1 or
C1 ∪ i and (ii) NB∗x (R) = C2\i. Since (C1, C2) maximal, x ∈ ϕ (R) and ϕ (R) =
Y ∪x. Now let R##i be such that x ∈ B∗(R##i ). Then ϕ(R##i , R−i) = Y. Therefore,
by strategy-proofness, [Y ∪ x] Ri Y.
It follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 5 that:
Theorem 3. The separable domain is the unique maximal domain, within rich
domains, over which every rule in Family Φ∗, without any vetoer or dummy, is
strategy-proof.
5 Concluding remarks
Our impossibility result, Theorem 2, relies on domain properties, Property P or
Property Q. There are various restricted subdomains that do not satisfy these
properties. Examples are the trichotomous domain SNTri and the dichotomous do-
main SNDi defined in Example ??. Characterizations of strategy-proof and efficient
rules over these subdomains are established by Ju (2002c).
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Voting rules can be efficient at least over some subdomains, although not over
the entire separable domain. Since there are finite numbers of objects and agents,
every voting rule have possibly multiple maximal subdomains over which it is
efficient. It would be interesting to identify these maximal domains, particularly
for some standard rules such as “plurality rule” and “unanimity rule”.
Over the linear separable domain, it is shown by Barberà, Sonnenschein,
and Zhou (1991) that strategy-proofness and a slightly stronger version of voter
sovereignty imply “tops-only” property, which corresponds to votes-only property
in our preference domain. However, when non-linear preferences are admissible
also, this implication no longer holds. The following example shows this.
Example 9. Let ϕ be defined as follows. Fix a, b ∈ A. For all R ∈ D, if a P1 b,
then ϕ (R) ≡ A\B (R1) ; otherwise, ϕ (R) ≡ G (R1) . It is easy to show that
ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness and the notion of “voter sovereignty” in Barberà,
Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991). Clearly, ϕ violates votes-only property since it
relies on the ordering between a and b. ¤
The above rule is dictatorial. However, using the similar idea in its definition,
we can also define non-dictatorial rules violating votes-only property.
Strategy-proofness pertains to the strategic misrepresentation of preferences
by a single agent. When agents can form coalitions and manipulate the out-
come jointly misrepresenting their preferences, we need a stronger requirement
to prevent such manipulation.
Coalitional strategy-proofness. For all R ∈ SN , all N ′ ⊆ N, and all R′N ′ ∈
SN ′ , if ϕ(R′N ′ , R−N ′) Pi ϕ(R) for some i ∈ N ′, then ϕ(R) Pj ϕ (R′N ′ , R−N ′), for
some j ∈ N ′.
We refer readers to Moulin (1993) for a survey of literature on coalitional
strategy-proofness. When a rule in Family Φ∗ satisfies this requirement and the
full-range condition, coalitional strategy-proofness, applied to the grand coali-
tion N , implies efficiency. Thus, by Theorem 2, this rule is serially dictatorial.
However, serial dictatorship violates coalitional strategy-proofness. To prove this,
consider the serially dictatorial rule associated with permutation π. Let R be the
profile in which all objects other than a are null for all agents, a is a null for agent
π (1), a is a good for agent π (2) , and a is a bad for π (3) . Then a will be chosen
for R. But if π (1) and π (3) make a coalition and report jointly (R′1, R3) such
that all objects except a are nulls for R′1 and a is a bad for R
′
1, then a will not be
chosen making π (3) better off, without making π (1) worse off. Therefore, there
is no coalitionally strategy-proof rule satisfying the full-range condition within
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Family Φ∗. Since any rule in Family Φ∗, satisfying voter sovereignty, satisfies the
full-range condition, we have the following result.
Corollary 4. If there are at least three agents, then there exists no voting rule
that satisfies coalitional strategy-proofness, null-independence, and voter sovereignty.
When there are only two agents, serially dictatorial rules in Family Φ∗ satisfy
all the three requirements. In the two agents case, since the grand coalition is
the only non-singleton coalition, it can be easily shown that the combination of
coalitional strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty is equivalent to the combina-
tion of strategy-proofness and efficiency. When there are at least three agents,
dropping voter sovereignty, we are left with only a small subfamily of Family Φ∗,
containing only the rules that either always select or never select each object,
possibly except, at most, one object (see Ju, 2002b, for more details).
A Proofs
Throughout this section, let D ∈ {SN ,SNadd}.
To prove Proposition 1, we show that the combination of monotonicity and
independence is equivalent to the following property. A rule ϕ is objectwise
monotonic if for all x ∈ A and all R, R′ ∈ D with NGx (R) ⊆ NGx (R′) and
NBx (R) ⊇ NBx (R′) , x ∈ ϕ(R) ⇒ x ∈ ϕ(R′) .27 We need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all R,R′ ∈ D and all x ∈ A, if NGx (R) ⊆ NGx (R′) and NBx (R) ⊇
NBx (R
′), then there exists R̄ ∈ D such that R̄|{{x},?} ≡ R′|{{x},?} and for all i ∈ N,
G(R̄i) ⊇ G(Ri) and B(R̄i) ⊆ B(Ri).
Proof. Let R, R′ ∈ D and x ∈ A be such that NGx (R) ⊆ NGx (R′), NBx (R) ⊇
NBx (R
′). Since NGx (R) ⊆ NGx (R′) and NBx (R) ⊇ NBx (R′), then N is partitioned
into the following five subsets, NGx (R), N
G
x (R
′)\NGx (R), NBx (R′), NBx (R)\(NBx (R′)∪
NGx (R
′)), and N\(NGx (R′) ∪NBx (R)).
For all i ∈ NGx (R) ∪NBx (R′) ∪
[
N\(NGx (R′) ∪NBx (R))
]
, let R̄i = Ri. By A2,
for all i ∈ NGx (R′)\NGx (R), there exists R̄i ∈ Di such that G(R̄i) ⊇ G(Ri) ∪ {x}
and B(R̄i) ⊆ B(Ri)\{x}. By A3, for all i ∈ NBx (R)\(NBx (R′) ∪ NGx (R′)), there
exists R̄i ∈ Di such that G(R̄i) ⊇ G(Ri), B(R̄i) ⊆ B(Ri), and x /∈ G(R̄i)∪B(R̄i).
27Objectwise monotonicity is similar to “monotonicity” or “non-negative responsiveness” in
the classical voting model. See the “monotonicity” in Murakami (1966), the condition of “pos-
itive association” in Arrow (1964), and the “monotonicity” in Blau (1957). See also Aizerman
and Aleskerov (1986) and Aleskerov and Duggan (1993).
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Then clearly, for all i ∈ N, G(R̄i) ⊇ G(Ri), B(R̄i) ⊆ B(Ri), and R̄i|{{x},?} ≡
R′i|{{x},?}.
Lemma 2. A rule satisfies monotonicity and independence if and only if it
satisfies objectwise monotonicity.
Proof. We only prove that both monotonicity and independence imply objectwise
monotonicity. We omit the remaining part.
Let ϕ : D → 2A satisfy monotonicity and independence. Let x ∈ A and
R,R′ ∈ D be such that NGx (R) ⊆ NGx (R′), NBx (R) ⊇ NBx (R′), and x ∈ ϕ(R).
By Lemma 1, there exists R̄ such that R̄|{{x},?} ≡ R′|{{x},?} and for all i ∈ N,
G(R̄i) ⊇ G(Ri) and B(R̄i) ⊆ B(Ri). Therefore by monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(R) implies
x ∈ ϕ(R̄). Since R̄i|{{x},?} = R′i|{{x},?}, then by independence, x ∈ ϕ(R′).
We next show that rules in Family Φ∗ are the only rules satisfying monotonic-
ity and independence.
Proof of Proposition 1. Clearly, every rule in Family Φ∗ satisfies monotonicity
and independence. Let ϕ satisfy the monotonicity and independence. Then by
Lemma 2, ϕ also satisfies objectwise monotonicity.
Let x ∈ A. Let Cx be defined as follows: (C1, C2) ∈ Cx if and only if C1∩C2 =
∅ and there exists R ∈ D such that NGx (R) ⊆ C1, NBx (R) ⊇ C2, and x ∈ ϕ(R).
Then by objectwise monotonicity, for each x ∈ A, Cx satisfies P-monotonicity.
Let ϕ̂ be the rule in Family Φ∗, associated with (Cx)x∈A. We only have to show
that ϕ = ϕ̂. Let R ∈ D. If x ∈ ϕ(R), then (NGx (R), NBx (R)) ∈ Cx. Therefore
x ∈ ϕ̂(R). Hence ϕ(R) ⊆ ϕ̂(R). Let x ∈ ϕ̂(R). Then (NGx (R), NBx (R)) ∈ Cx.
Therefore there exists R′ ∈ D such that NGx (R′) ⊆ NGx (R), NBx (R′) ⊇ NBx (R),
and x ∈ ϕ(R′). By objectwise monotonicity, x ∈ ϕ(R). Hence ϕ(R) ⊇ ϕ̂(R).
In order to prove Propositions 2 and 3, we use a sequence of lemmas similar
to those in the proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.28 Thus the following
notions of “decisiveness” are needed. Let ϕ be a rule. Let M ⊆ N and x ∈ A. A
group S ⊆ N\M is positively M -posterior -decisive for x, or simply, positively
M-decisive for x if for all R ∈ D with M ⊆ N\ (NGx (R) ∪NBx (R)
)
,
S ⊆ NGx (R) ⇒ x ∈ ϕ(R) .
When M = ∅, we say S is positively decisive for x. A group S ⊆ N\M
is positively M-decisive if the group is positively L-decisive for all objects.
28Arrow (1964).
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When M = ∅, we say S is positively decisive. A group S ⊆ N\M is nega-
tively M-decisive for x if for all R ∈ D with M ⊆ N\ (NGx (R) ∪NBx (R)
)
,
S ⊆ NBx (R) ⇒ x 6∈ ϕ(R) .
When M = ∅, we say S is negatively decisive for x. A group S ⊆ N\M
is negatively M-decisive if the group is negatively M -decisive for all objects.
When M = ∅, we say S is negatively decisive.
Moreover we also need to establish the following previous results, Lemmas 3-8.
We omit the proof of the first one since it is straightforward.
Lemma 3. Let ϕ be objectwise monotonic and x ∈ A. Let M ⊆ N. Assume
that there exists R ∈ D such that M ⊆ N\ (NGx (R) ∪NBx (R)
)
and NGx (R) =
(N\M)\NBx (R).
(i) If x ∈ ϕ(R), then NGx (R) is positively M-decisive for x.
(ii) If x /∈ ϕ(R), then NBx (R) is negatively M-decisive for x.
Lemma 4. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Given an objectwise monotonic and
efficient rule, if a group is positively M-decisive for an object, then the group is
positively M-decisive.
Proof. We use Property P of the domain D. The same proof can be established
using Property Q instead. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Let ϕ be objectwise
monotonic and efficient. Let S ⊆ N\M and x ∈ A. Assume that S is positively
M -decisive for x. Let y ∈ A\{x}. We only have to show that S is positively
M -decisive for y.
For all i ∈ S, by P1, there exists Ri ∈ Di such that
y Pi x Pi ∅,
for all z ∈ A\{x, y},
∅ Pi z.
For all j ∈ (N\M)\S, by P1, there exists Rj ∈ Dj such that
∅ Pj y Pj x,
for all z ∈ A\{x, y},
∅ Pj z.
For all m ∈ M, by P2, there exists Rm ∈ Dm such that
x Im y Im ∅,
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for all z ∈ A\{x, y},
∅ Pm z.
Then by efficiency, ϕ(R) ⊆ {x, y}. Since S is positively M -decisive for x, then
ϕ(R) = {x} or {x, y}. Since for all j ∈ N\M, {y} Pj {x}, for all m ∈ M,
{y} Im {x}, and N\M 6= ∅, then by efficiency, ϕ(R) = {x, y}. Since M ⊆
N\(NGy (R) ∪NBy (R)), NGy (R) = S and NBy (R) = N\S, then, by Lemma 3, S is
positively M -decisive for y.
Lemma 5. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Given an objectwise monotonic and
efficient rule, if a group containing more than two agents is positively M-decisive,
then the group contains a positively M-decisive proper subgroup.
Proof. We use Property P of the domain D. The same proof can be established
using Property Q instead. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Let ϕ be objectwise
monotonic and efficient. Let S ⊆ N\M, |S| ≥ 2, and i ∈ S. Assume that S is
positively M -decisive. We show that either S\i or i is positively M -decisive. By
Lemma 4, we only have to show that there exists x ∈ A such that either S\i or i
is positively M -decisive for x ∈ A. Since |A| ≥ 3, there exist three objects, x, y, z,
in A.
By P1, there exists Ri ∈ Di such that:
y Pi {y, z} Pi x Pi ∅ Pi z,
for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z},
∅ Pi w.
For all j ∈ S\{i}, by P1, there exists Rj ∈ Dj such that:
z Pj {y, z} Pj x Pj ∅ Pj y,
for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z},
∅ Pj {w}.
For all h ∈ (N\M)\S, by P1, there exists Rh ∈ Dh such that:
∅ Ph {y},
∅ Ph {z},
∅ Ph {y, z} Pi {x},
for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z},
∅ Ph {w}.
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For all m ∈ M, by P2, there exists Rm ∈ Dm such that
{x} Im {y} Im {z} Im ∅,
for all w ∈ A\{x, y, z},
∅ Pm {w}.
Then by separability and efficiency, ϕ(R) ⊆ {x, y, z}. Since S is positively M -
decisive, then x ∈ ϕ(R). Since for all j ∈ N\M, {y, z} Pj {x}, for all m ∈ M,
{y, z} Im {x}, and N\M 6= ∅, then by efficiency, ϕ(R) ∩ {y, z} 6= ∅. Note
that M ⊆ N\(NGy (R) ∪ NBy (R)), NGy (R) = {i}, NBy (R) = (N\M)\{i}, M ⊆
N\(NGz (R)∪NBz (R)), NGz (R) = S\{i}, and NBz (R) = (N\M)\(S\{i}). Therefore
by Lemma 3, if y ∈ ϕ(R), then i is positively M -decisive for y and if z ∈ ϕ(R),
then S\{i} is positively M -decisive for z.
We next state two lemmas on negative decisiveness, corresponding to Lem-
mas 4 and 5. The proofs are similar to the previous proofs.
Lemma 6. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Given an objectwise monotonic and
efficient rule, if a nonempty group is negatively M-decisive for an object, then the
group is negatively M-decisive.
Lemma 7. Let M ⊆ N and N\M 6= ∅. Given an objectwise monotonic and
efficient rule, if a group containing more than two agents is negatively M-decisive,
then the group contains a negatively M-decisive proper subgroup.
For all Ri ∈ Di and all Y ⊆ A, let G(Ri, Y ) ≡ G(Ri) ∩ Y and B(Ri, Y ) ≡
B(Ri) ∩ Y. We next state a useful property of a separable preference. The proof
is trivial.
Lemma 8. Let X and Y be disjoint subsets of A. Let R0 ∈ S. Then
T ∈ Max{R0, {X ∪ Z : Z ⊆ Y }} ⇔ X ∪G(R0, Y ) ⊆ T ⊆ X ∪ (Y \B(R0, Y )) .
Lemma 9. If a rule is objectwise monotonic and efficient, then it is serially
dictatorial.
Proof. Let ϕ be objectwise monotonic and efficient.
Step 1. There exists a permutation π on N such that for all k ∈ {1, · · · , n},
π(k) is {π(1), · · · , π(k − 1)}-decisive.
Let M1 ≡ ∅. We first show that there exists an agent who is both positively
and negatively M1-decisive. By efficiency of ϕ, N is positively M1-decisive. By
Lemma 5, there exists a positively M1-decisive proper subgroup S of N. If S is
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singleton, then we are done. Otherwise we apply Lemma 5 to S. Since there are
finite number of agents, then iterating this argument, we can find an agent i ∈ N
who is positively M1-decisive. Using Lemma 7 and the same argument as above,
we show that there exists a negatively M1-decisive agent j ∈ N . If i 6= j, then
for all R ∈ D with a ∈ G(Ri) and a ∈ B(Rj), we have a ∈ ϕ(R) and a /∈ ϕ(R).
This is a contradiction. Therefore i = j.
Let i1 be M
1-decisive. Now let M2 ≡ {i1}. If N\M2 is not empty, then by
efficiency, N\M2 is M2-decisive. Using the same argument as above, we show
that there exists i2 ∈ N\M2 who is M2-decisive. Let M3 ≡ {i1, i2}. Then if
N\M3 is not empty, then by efficiency, N\M3 is M3-decisive. Using the same
argument as above, we show that there exists i3 ∈ N\M3 who is M3-decisive.
Proceeding this way, we find (i1, i2, · · · , in) such that for all k ∈ {1, · · · , n}, ik
is Mk-decisive, where Mk ≡ {i1, · · · , ik−1}. Let π be the permutation on N such
that for all k ∈ N, π(k) ≡ ik. Then π satisfies the desired property.
Step 2. Let Xπ(1) ≡ ∅ and Yπ(1) ≡ A. For all k ∈ {2, · · · , n}, let
Xπ(k) ≡ Xπ(k−1) ∪G(Rπ(k−1), Yπ(k−1)) and
Yπ(k) ≡ Yπ(k−1)\
[
G(Rπ(k−1), Yπ(k−1)) ∪B(Rπ(k−1), Yπ(k−1))
]
.
Then for all k ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}, Mk(R, π) = {Xπ(k+1) ∪ Z : Z ⊆ Yπ(k+1)}
Without loss of generality, we assume that π(1) = 1, · · · , π(n) = n. Clearly by
separability, M1(R, π) ≡ Max{R1, 2A} = {G(R1, A)∪Z : Z ⊆ A\ [G(R1, A) ∪B(R1, A)]}.
Therefore the result holds for k = 1. Suppose by induction that the result holds
for k = m, where m ∈ {1, · · · , n−2}. By definition, Mm(R, π) ≡ Max{Rm,Mm−1(R, π)}.
Since by the induction hypothesis, Mm−1(R, π) = {Xm ∪ Z : Z ⊆ Ym}, then by
Lemma 8, Mm(R, π) = {Xm∪G(Rm, Ym)∪Z : Z ⊆ Ym\ [G(Rm, Ym) ∪B(Rm, Ym)] .
Hence Mm(R, π) = {Xm+1 ∪ Z : Z ⊆ Ym+1}.
Step 3. The rule ϕ is serially dictatorial with respect to π.
Without loss of generality, we assume that π(1) = 1, · · · , π(n) = n. By Step 2
and Lemma 8, we only have to show that for all k ∈ N,
Xk ∪G(Rk, Yk) ⊆ ϕ(R) ⊆ Xk ∪ (Yk\B(Rk, Yk)). (3)
Since agent 1 is decisive, G(R1) ⊆ ϕ(R) ⊆ A\B(R1). Hence (3) holds for k =
1. Suppose by induction that (3) holds for k ∈ {2, · · · , n − 1}. We first show
Xk+1 ∪ G(Rk+1, Yk+1) ⊆ ϕ(R). Let x ∈ Xk+1 ∪ G(Rk+1, Yk+1). If x ∈ Xk+1,
then x ∈ Xk ∪ G(Rk, Yk) and so by the induction hypothesis, x ∈ ϕ(R). Let
x ∈ G(Rk+1, Yk+1)\Xk+1. Since x ∈ Yk+1, then for all i ≤ k, {x} Ii ∅. Since k + 1
is {1, · · · , k}-decisive, x ∈ ϕ(R). Therefore Xk+1 ∪G(Rk+1, Yk+1) ⊆ ϕ(R).
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Next we show ϕ(R) ⊆ Xk+1∪(Yk+1\B(Rk+1, Yk+1)). Suppose by contradiction
that x /∈ Xk+1 ∪ (Yk+1\B(Rk+1, Yk+1)). Then x /∈ Xk+1. And x /∈ Yk+1 or x ∈
B(Rk+1, Yk+1). In order to show x /∈ ϕ(R), we divide two cases.
Case 1. x /∈ Xk+1 and x /∈ Yk+1. Since x /∈ Xk+1, then for all i ∈ {1, · · · , k},
x /∈ G(Ri, Yi). Since x /∈ Yk+1, x ∈ ∪ki=1 [G(Ri, Yi) ∪B(Ri, Yi)] . Therefore there
exists i∗ ∈ {1, · · · , k} such that x ∈ B(Ri∗ , Yi∗) and for all i < i∗, x /∈ G(Ri, Yi)∪
B(Ri, Yi). Clearly x ∈ Yi∗ . Since Y1 ⊇ Y2 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Yn, then for all i < i∗,
x ∈ Yi. Therefore for all i < i∗, {x} Ii ∅. Since i∗ is {1, · · · , i∗ − 1}-decisive and
x ∈ B(Ri∗ , Yi∗), then x /∈ ϕ(R).
Case 2. x /∈ Xk+1 and x ∈ B(Rk+1, Yk+1). Since x ∈ Yk+1, then for all
i ≤ k, {x} Ii ∅. Since k + 1 is {1, · · · , k}-decisive and x ∈ B(Rk+1, Yk+1), then
x /∈ ϕ(R).
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 2, every monotonic and independent rule is
objectwise monotonic. Therefore it follows directly from Proposition 1 and Lemma 9,
that if a rule satisfies the two axioms and efficiency, then it is a serially dictatorial
rule in Family Φ∗.
Note that the proofs of Lemmas 4-7 are carried out in such a way that when
M ≡ ∅, they are valid replacing efficiency with weak efficiency. Therefore, using
Lemmas 4-7 and the argument in the first part (four paragraphs) of Step 1 in
Proof of Lemma 9, we show that if a rule is objectwise monotonic and weakly
efficient, then there exists a decisive agent.
Lemma 10. If a rule is objectwise monotonic and weakly efficient, then there
exists i ∈ N such that for all R ∈ D, G(Ri) ⊆ ϕ(R) ⊆ A\B(Ri).
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from Propo-
sition 1 and Lemma 10.
To prove Proposition 4 and therefore Theorems 1 and 2, we need the following
four lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof voting rule. Let R ∈ D, i ∈ N, and
x ∈ A. Then if x ∈ ϕ(R), then for all R′i ∈ Di with x ∈ G(R′i), x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).29
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness and votes-only property. Let i ∈ N and
x ∈ A. Let R ∈ D and R′i ∈ Di be such that x ∈ ϕ(R) and x ∈ G(R′i). By
R1, there exists R∗i ∈ Di be such that (G(R∗i ), B(R∗i )) ≡ (G(R′i), B(R′i)) and for
29Lemmas 11 and 12 are similar to the arguments used by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and
Zhou (1991) in their proof of Lemma 1.
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all X,X ′ ⊆ A\{x}, X ∪ {x} P ∗i X ′.Then by votes-only property, ϕ(R∗i , R−i) =
ϕ(R′i, R−i). By strategy-proofness, x ∈ ϕ(R∗i , R−i). Therefore x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Lemma 12. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof voting rule. Let R ∈ D, i ∈ N, and
x ∈ A. Then if x 6∈ ϕ(R), then for all R′i ∈ Di with x ∈ B(R′i), x 6∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness and votes-only property. Let i ∈ N and
x ∈ A. Let R ∈ D and R′i ∈ Di be such that x 6∈ ϕ(R) and x ∈ B(R′i). By R2,
there exists R∗i ∈ Di be such that (G(R∗i ), B(R∗i )) ≡ (G(R′i), B(R′i)) and for all
X ⊆ A\{x}, X P ∗i X∪{x}.Then by votes-only property, ϕ(R∗i , R−i) = ϕ(R′i, R−i).
By strategy-proofness, x 6∈ ϕ(R∗i , R−i). Therefore x 6∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Using Lemmas 11 and 12, we can establish Lemmas 13 and 14 which are
crucial to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma 13. Every voting rule satisfying strategy-proofness and null-independence
satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, votes-only property, and null-independence.
Let R,R′ ∈ D be such that for all i ∈ N, G(Ri) ⊆ G(R′i) and B(Ri) ⊇ B(R′i).
Let x ∈ ϕ(R). Then if x ∈ G(R1), then since x ∈ G(R′1), by Lemma 11, we
have x ∈ ϕ(R′1, R−1). If x ∈ B(R1), then by Lemma 12, x ∈ ϕ(R′1, R−1). If
x /∈ G(R1) ∪B(R1), then there are two cases: x ∈ G(R′1) or x /∈ G(R′1) ∪B(R′1).
In the first case, by Lemma 11, x ∈ ϕ(R′1, R−1). In the second case, by null-
independence, x ∈ ϕ(R′1, R−1). Therefore, ϕ(R) ⊆ ϕ(R′1, R−1). Applying the
same argument, successively changing preferences of agents, we can show that
ϕ(R) ⊆ ϕ(R′).
Lemma 14. Every voting rule satisfying strategy-proofness and null-independence
satisfies independence.
Proof. Let ϕ satisfy strategy-proofness, votes-only property, and null-independence.
Let R, R′ ∈ D be such that R|{{x},?} ≡ R′|{{x},?}}. We only have to show that
x ∈ ϕ(R) ⇒ x ∈ ϕ(R′). Let S1 ≡ NGx (R)(= NGx (R′)), S2 ≡ NBx (R)(= NBx (R′)),
and S3 ≡ N\ (S1 ∪ S2) . For all i ∈ S1, by Lemma 11, x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i). If we apply
the same argument, changing preferences of agents in S1 successively, then we
obtain x ∈ ϕ(R′S1 , R−S1). Let R̄ ≡ (R′S1 , R−S1). For all i ∈ S2, by Lemma 12,
x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R̄−i). If we apply the same argument, changing preferences of agents
in S2 successively, then we obtain x ∈ ϕ(R′S2 , R̄−S2). Let R̂ ≡ (R′S2 , R̄−S2).
For all i ∈ S3, by null-independence, x ∈ ϕ(R′i, R̂−i). If we apply the same
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argument, changing preferences of agents in S3 successively, then we obtain
x ∈ ϕ(R′S3 , R̂−S3). Therefore, since (R′S3 , R̂−S3) = R′, x ∈ ϕ(R′).
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemmas 13 and 14, strategy-proofness and null-independence
imply monotonicity and independence. The converse also holds, since every mono-
tonic and independent rule is in Family Φ∗ and so satisfies strategy-proofness and
null-independence.
References
[1] Aizerman, M.A. and F.T. Aleskerov (1986), “Voting operators in the space
of choice functions”, Mathematical Social Sciences 11:201-242
[2] Aleskerov, F.T. and J. Duggan (1993), “Functional voting operators: the
non-monotonic case”, Mathematical Social Sciences 26:175-201
[3] Arrow, K.J. (1964), Social choice and individual values, 2nd edition, New
York: John Wiley
[4] Barberà, S., F. Gül, and E. Stacchetti (1993) “Generalized median voter
schemes and committees”, Journal of Economic Theory 61:262-289
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